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THE CANADIAN INDIAN FREE PASSAGE RIGHT: 
THE LAST STRONGHOLD OF EXPLICIT RACE RESTRICTION 




Peter Roberts had a problem.  A Canadian citizen and a member of the 
Campbell River Band of Canadian Indians,1 Roberts regularly crossed the 
United States-Canada border to visit his property in Point Roberts, Wash-
ington.2  He had a “green card,” and had been crossing the border since he 
was a young boy with his family to visit relatives on the Lummi Indian 
Reservation.3  In 2007, however, immigration officials confiscated his 
green card and required him to appear in an immigration court.4  The issue 
was whether he had enough Indian “blood” to cross the border as a Cana-
dian Indian entitled to free passage into the United States.5  Roberts has fair 
skin and curly hair inherited from his Ukrainian mother, but the facial fea-
tures of his Indian father.6  Roberts asserted that his physical appearance 
caused immigration officials to question his right to free passage.7  Both 
American and Canadian press reports emphasized the curious racial aspect 
 
∗Assistant Attorney General, Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, Arizona.  
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Chin, Marian Smith, Rose Villazor, Marcia Yablon-Zug, and the participants at the 2008 Indian 
Law Works in Progress Symposium at the University of Colorado School of Law, particularly 
Melissa Tatum, my commentator at that workshop.  Thanks to Dr. Michael Posluns for informa-
tion on Canadian law as well as to the staff of the North Dakota Law Review for their work in 
editing the article.  Finally, many thanks to my family, Bidtah, Bahe and Tazbah for all their love 
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1. The author uses the term “Indian” as that is the term used in Canadian Law.  Indians are 
one of three groups identified as aboriginal peoples in the Canadian Constitution.  Part II of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
2. Lornet Turnbull, Canadian Indian Wonders Why U.S. Yanking Back Welcome Mat, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at A1. 
3. Id. 
4. Lornet Turnbull, Immigration Case Hinges on Degree of Indian Blood, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 2008, at B3. 
5. Id.; Terri Theodore, Aboriginal Canadian Regains U.S. Green Card in Fight Over Native 
Status, CNEWS, Mar. 26, 2008, available at http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2008/03/26/ 
5112206-cp html. 
6. Turnbull, supra note 2, at A1. 
7. Turnbull, supra note 4, at B3; Theodore, supra note 5. 
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of Roberts’ situation.8  How could it be that a person had to prove his racial 
ancestry in 2008? 
Peter Roberts’s situation is not unique, or academic. Canadian Indians 
have significant privileges under American immigration law.9  They do not 
need an immigration visa to enter the United States.10  They are lawful 
permanent residents simply by residing in the United States.11  They cannot 
be deported for any reason.12  They can work in the United States and can 
also receive public benefits under certain circumstances.13  But there’s a 
catch: these privileges apply only to “persons who possess at least 50 per 
centum of blood of the American Indian race.”14  Not all Canadian Indians 
are eligible; the privileges are restricted by the amount of a person’s Indian 
ancestry.15  That was Roberts’ problem.  According to attorneys for the 
United States, though he claimed one-half, that is 50%, Indian blood, his 
paternal grandmother identified her father as Irish in immigration 
documents, meaning his father was not a “full-blood” Indian, and Roberts 
therefore could not have 50% Indian blood.16  Though ultimately the United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services issued a green card under 
another category of eligibility,17 Roberts’s situation broadcasted the 
 
8. Theodore, supra note 5; Turnbull, supra note 2, at A1. 
9. See generally American Indian Law Alliance, Border Crossing Rights, available at 
http://www.ailanyc.org/bordercrossing%20memo.pdf (discussing the privileges of Canadian In-
dians).  This publication is a guide issued by the American Indian Law Alliance, an organization 
located in New York City that advises Canadian Indians on border crossing issues.  Id. 
10. 22 C.F.R. § 42.1(f) (2006). 
11. 8 C.F.R. § 289.2 (2006). 
12. Matter of Yellowquill, 16 I. & N. Dec. 576, 578 (B.I.A. 1978). 
13. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Admin. for Children and Families, Office of 
Family Assistance, Policy Announcement No. TANF-ACF-PA-2005-01 (Nov. 15, 2005) available 
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/policy/pa-ofa/2005/pa2005-1 htm (discussing the right of 
Canadian Indians to public benefits). 
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006). 
15. Blood quantum is a metaphor to describe a person’s ancestry. See Paul Spruhan, A Legal 
History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Spruhan, Legal History].  The amount of Indian “blood” depends on the status of a person’s 
ancestors. Id.  Someone with an Indian father and a non-Indian mother has one-half Indian blood, 
while a person with one Indian grandmother, and three non-Indian grandparents has one-quarter 
Indian blood. Id.  As discussed below, Canada does not require a threshold blood quantum to be 
recognized as Indian under Canadian law. See infra text accompanying notes 118-20. 
16. Turnbull, supra note 4.   Assuming Roberts’s paternal grandmother had one-half Indian 
blood, and his paternal grandfather was a full-blood Indian, Roberts would have three-eighths In-
dian blood.  See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, PHOENIX AREA OFFICE, TRIBAL ENROLLMENT 67 
(1984) (chart to calculate Indian blood quantum).  This assumes his mother has no Indian blood. 
17. Theodore, supra note 5.  The press article does not identify the other category federal 
immigration officials used to issue Roberts’s green card. Id. 
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Canadian Indian issue to a wide audience,18 and exposed the last explicit 
racial restriction in American immigration law. 
Using Roberts’ case as a starting point, this article reviews the tangled 
legal history of the Canadian Indian free passage right to answer the ques-
tion why such a racial restriction continues to exist today.19  Part II-A dis-
cusses the origins of Indians’ free passage right in treaties between the 
United States and Great Britain, and a congressional statute passed in 1928.  
Part II-B, through an analysis of cases and administrative policies,20 shows 
how officials struggled to define “Canadian Indian” under the 1928 act, 
conceptualizing Indian status at first as a “political” status defined by Cana-
dian law and then as a “racial” status defined by American law.  Part II-C 
then discusses the adoption of the blood quantum restriction as part of a 
comprehensive overhaul of American immigration law in 1952, and the ap-
parent reasons for why Congress adopted a half-blood rule. 
In section III, the article discusses problems arising after 1952 for Ca-
nadian Indians, like Peter Roberts, who must prove their amount of Indian 
blood to invoke their passage right.  Section IV discusses the implications 
of the explicit racial restriction for federal Indian law and immigration law.  
It notes that both are premised on congressional “plenary power,” histori-
cally outside constitutional review by the United States Supreme Court.  It 
discusses how the Supreme Court, since the 1970s, has reviewed the consti-
tutionality of Indian legislation under equal protection principles, but has 
not done so for immigration legislation premised on race.21  Contrasting the 
current state of racial legislation under Congress’s powers to legislate in In-
dian affairs with its power to legislate concerning immigration, the article 
suggests that the blood quantum restriction for Canadian Indian free pas-
sage may present an opportunity to distinguish definitions in federal Indian 
law that use blood quantum and to challenge prior precedent exempting 
immigration legislation from judicial scrutiny.22 
 
18. Press reports of Roberts’ case were posted on both immigration and Indian law blogs.  
See The Jay Treaty in U.S. Immigration Court, Turtle Talk Blog, Jan. 20, 2008, http://turtle-
talk.wordpress.com/2008/01/20/the-jay-treaty-in-us-immigration-court; Immigration Case Hinges 
on Indian (Native American) Blood, ImmigrationProf Blog, Jan. 19, 2008, http://lawprofes 
sors.typepad.com/immigration/2008/01/immigration-cas html (describing Roberts’ situation as “a 
fascinating immigration case”). 
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006). 
20. The article discusses documents found in Immigration and Naturalization Service file no. 
55873/734, held in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., Record Group 85, Entry 9, as well 
as Board of Review, Board of Immigration Appeals, and federal court decisions. 
21. See infra notes 151-60 and 164-47 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 161-63 and 170-87 and accompanying text. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. ORIGINS OF THE FREE PASSAGE RIGHT 
The Canadian Indian free passage right is recognized in both treaties 
and statutory law.  The Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and 
Great Britain recognizes the right of Indians to cross the border freely.23  
The specific language is: 
It is agreed that it shall at all Times be free to His Majesty’s Sub-
jects, and to the Citizens of the United States, and also to the In-
dians dwelling on either side of the said Boundary Line freely to 
pass and repass by Land, or Inland Navigation, into the respective 
Territories and Countries of the Two Parties on the Continent of 
America.24 
After the War of 1812, the Treaty of Ghent between the two nations af-
firmed free passage by recognizing Indian rights existing prior to the war.25  
There is much debate whether the War of 1812 abrogated the Jay Treaty, 
and whether the Treaty of Ghent, absent implementing legislation, by itself 
reinstated the free passage right.26  Indians today still invoke the Jay Treaty 
 
23. Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation, between His Britannick Majesty; and The 
United States of America, by Their President, with the advice and consent of their Senate (Jay 
Treaty), art. III, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ 
jay.asp#art3. 
24. Id. (emphasis added).  Interestingly, the free passage right is not restricted to Indians in 
the treaty.  However, the United States Supreme Court held that the free passage right of non-
Indian British citizens was abrogated by the War of 1812.  See Karnuth v. United States ex rel. 
Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 240 (1929).  The Court has never decided whether the Indian right was also 
abrogated. 
25. Treaty of Peace and Amity between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of 
America (Treaty of Ghent), art. 9, December 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218, 22-23, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ghent.asp.  The specific language is: 
The United States of America engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification 
of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom 
they may be at war at the time of such ratification; and forthwith to restore to such 
tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they 
may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, 
previous to such hostilities. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
26. See, e.g., Leah Castella, The United States Border:  A Barrier to Cultural Survival, 5 
TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 191, 207-12 (2000) (arguing that the Jay Treaty and Treaty of Ghent obli-
gate the United States to recognize the free passage right); William Di Iorio, Mending Fences:  
The Fractured Relationship Between Native American Tribes and the Federal Government and its 
Negative Impact on Border Security, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 407, 413 (2007) (discussing recogni-
tion in the Jay Treaty and Treaty of Ghent and alleged infringement of such treaty rights in Amer-
ican and Canadian law); J. Tonra, Note, The Threat of Border Security on Indigenous Free Pas-
sage Rights in North America, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 221, 223-26 (2006) (discussing 
the Jay Treaty and Treaty of Ghent and their relationship to free passage rights); Bryan Nickels, 
Note, Native American Free Passage Rights under the 1794 Jay Treaty: Survival under United 
States Statutory Law and Canadian Common Law, 24 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 313, 315 n.18, 
        
2009] THE CANADIAN INDIAN FREE PASSAGE RIGHT 305 
as the source of their free passage right, and they assert exemptions from 
any limitations under American law, including the recent imposition of 
passport requirements under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.27  
However, regardless of whether the treaty right remains viable or not, since 
1928, American statutory law has allowed Indians to pass freely over the 
border.28 
 
338 (2001) (stating that the treaty right was abrogated and not reinstated, but arguing for recogni-
tion and preservation of free passage right “guaranteed” in Jay Treaty); Richard Osburn, Note, 
Problems and Solutions Regarding Indigenous Peoples Split by International Borders, 24 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 471, 475-80 (2000) (discussing divergent holdings on survival of Jay Treaty and 
arguing Treaty of Ghent revived free passage right); Marcia Yablon-Zug, Gone but not Forgotten:  
The Strange Afterlife of the Jay Treaty’s Indian Free Passage Right, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 565, 573-76 
(2007-2008) (arguing that the Jay Treaty was abrogated by the War of 1812, and that the Treaty of 
Ghent did not revive the right absent implementing legislation). 
 The United States Supreme Court ruled in a case not concerning the Indian free passage right 
that the War of 1812 abrogated the Jay Treaty.  Karnuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 
231, 240 (1929).  Further, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ruled in a case concerning an 
alleged Canadian Indian exemption from duty for importing goods that the War of 1812 abrogated 
the Jay Treaty, and that the Treaty of Ghent did not revive the right, as it required implementing 
congressional legislation. United States v. Garrow, 88 F.2d 318, 322-23 (C.C.P.A. 1937). 
27. See Documents Required for Travelers Departing from or Arriving in the United States at 
Sea and Land Ports-of-Entry from within the Western Hemisphere, Final Rule and Notice, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 18,384 (April 3, 2008) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 212, 235); Documents Required for Travelers 
Departing from or Arriving in the United States at Air Ports-of-Entry From Within the Western 
Hemisphere, Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,412 (Nov. 24, 2006) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 22, 235).  
These new rules require a passport for all travelers to enter the United States from other Western 
Hemisphere countries, and the federal agencies in charge of promulgating the rules rejected Cana-
dian Indian arguments that their free passage right exempted them from the requirement.  Final 
Rule, Sea and Land Phase, 73 Fed. Reg. at 18,397 (Apr. 3, 2008) (“The Jay Treaty of 1794 and 
other treaties do not prevent the Department [ ] [of Homeland Security] from requiring documen-
tary evidence of identity . . . from Native Americans and Canadian Indians.”); Final Rule, Air 
Phase, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,418 (Nov. 27, 2006) (“[A]ny right or privilege to ‘pass the border’ does 
not necessarily encompass a right to ‘pass the border’ without sufficient proof of identity and citi-
zenship.”). 
 For land and sea entries, the Department of Homeland Security might in the future accept 
Canadian federal government Indian identity cards (called “INAC” cards in the Final Rule) if they 
meet international document security standards, but currently requires passports for Canadian In-
dians to enter the United States.  See 73 Fed. Reg. at 18,397, 18,397-98 (Apr. 3, 2008).  Canadian 
Indian band documents, however, will not be accepted.  See id. 
28. See Act of April 2, 1928, ch. 308, 45 Stat. 401, 401 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1359 (2006)).  Interestingly, the report of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion on the 1928 act references both the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Ghent, and states that Cana-
dian Indians “are not asking to be admitted to citizenship, but that the rights secured to them by 
these treaties and taken away by the immigration act of 1924 be restored to them.”  H.R. REP. 70-
1017, at 2 (1928).  Representative MacGregor also mentioned the Jay Treaty when discussing the 
1928 bill on the House floor.  See 69 CONG. REC. 5582 (Mar. 29, 1928).  A federal district court 
later concluded that the language in the 1928 act “to pass the borders of the United States,” see 
8 U.S.C. § 1359, was intended to track the language of the Jay Treaty.  See Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F. 
Supp. 1210, 1220-21 (D. Maine 1974).  One scholar argues that the statutory right is actually 
broader than the treaty right, in that it allows all Indians in Canada, not just those with historical 
connections to the border, to pass freely into the United States.  See Yablon-Zug, supra note 26, at 
604. 
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Why did Congress feel it necessary to pass a statute?  Prior to 1924, 
Canadian Indians passed back and forth over the border with no trouble.29  
American officials sought to block non-Canadian aliens’ entry into the 
United States through inspections at ports-of-entry and agreements with 
shipping companies, but Canadians had little trouble entering the United 
States.30  Canadian Indians visited relatives in American tribes, worked as 
construction workers and seasonal agricultural workers, and otherwise 
crossed back and forth without incident.31 
All this changed in 1924, as an act of Congress threatened Canadian 
Indians’ traditional ability to cross freely into the United States. The act tied 
the right to enter the United States to the right to naturalize as a citizen, dec-
laring that a person ineligible for naturalization could not immigrate.32  This 
rule had a transparently racial intent, as only whites and “persons of African 
descent,” i.e. blacks, could be naturalized.33  The purpose of the restriction 
was to bar Japanese immigration.34  Prior laws barred other Asians from 
immigrating to the United States, and the 1924 provision intended to extend 
this prohibition to Japanese immigrants as well.35  Though targeting Asian 
immigration, immigration officials applied the restriction to Canadian In-
dians.36  As neither white nor black, they were ineligible for naturalization 
and therefore ineligible for immigration under the 1924 act.37  Based on the 
act, immigration officials attempted to exclude or deport Canadian In-
dians.38 
 
29. See Marian Smith, The INS and the Singular Status of North American Indians, 21 AM. 
IND. CULT. AND RES. J. 131, 136 (1997). 
30. See Marian Smith, The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at the U.S.-
Canadian Border, 1893-1993: An Overview of Issues and Topics, 26 MICH. HIST. REV. 127, 129-
132 (2000) (discussing American attempts to enforce immigration restrictions at Canadian bor-
der). 
31. Smith, supra note 29, at 136. 
32. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, sec. 13(c), 43 Stat. 153, 162 (repealed 1952). 
33. See Act of July 14, 1870, ch. CCLIV, sec. 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (codified as amended at 
8 U.S.C. § 1422) (extending naturalization to “aliens of African nativity and to persons of African 
descent”); Act of March 26, 1790, chap. III, sec. 1, Stat. 103 (repealed 1795) (limiting naturaliza-
tion to “any alien, being a free white person”). 
34. MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS 37, 38-49 (2004) (discussing the forces behind Japa-
nese exclusion). 
35. Id. at 37. 
36. Smith, supra note 29, at 136. 
37. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 70-1017, at 1 (1928) (stating that Canadian Indians were ineligible for 
naturalization and that the Department of Labor “deemed it its duty in the enforcement of the law 
to exclude them”).  Curiously, Congress in the same year declared American Indians citizens of 
the United States. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(b) (2006)). 
38. Smith, supra note 29, at 136; United States ex rel. Diabo v. McCandless, 18 F.2d 282, 
282 (E.D. Pa. 1927) (concerning habeas corpus petition of Mohawk Canadian Indian challenging 
deportation). 
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There were two separate responses to the attempted exclusion of Cana-
dian Indians:  (1) a successful court challenge by a Canadian Mohawk In-
dian, and (2) congressional legislation to exempt Canadian Indians from the 
1924 act.  Paul Diabo, an iron worker in Philadelphia, and a Mohawk In-
dian from Quebec, challenged the exclusion policy, arguing for his right to 
remain in the United States.39  The district court concluded that Diabo could 
not be deported, ruling that the aboriginal right, whether or not the Jay 
Treaty survived the War of 1812, allowed his free passage.40  The Third 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, but relied on the Jay Treaty 
and the Treaty of Ghent to justify Diabo’s free passage.41  Concurrently, 
Congress exempted Canadian Indians from the bar on immigration, passing 
a law that stated:  “[T]he Immigration Act of 1924 shall not be construed to 
apply to the right of American Indians born in Canada to pass the borders of 
the United States:  Provided, That this right shall not extend to persons 
whose membership in Indian tribes or families is created by adoption.”42  
Legislative history of the act shows that members of Congress were aware 
of Diabo’s litigation, and believed that they had never intended the racial 
bar on immigration to apply to the traditional crossing of Canadian In-
dians.43  They therefore believed it necessary to clarify that Indians re-
mained able to pass freely into the United States to visit relatives or for oth-
er purposes.44 
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1928 ACT 
In its haste to protect Canadian Indians from deportation and exclusion, 
Congress neglected to include one important element in its legislation:  a 
definition of “Indian.”  The Act did exclude persons “whose membership in 
 
39. See generally Diabo, 18 F.2d at 282; Gerald Reid, Illegal Alien?:  The Immigration Case 
of Mohawk Ironworker Paul K. Diabo, 151 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 61 (2007) (discussing 
Diabo and the circumstances surrounding his case). 
40. Diabo, 18 F.2d at 283. 
41. McCandless v. United States ex rel. Diabo, 25 F.2d 71, 72-73 (3d Cir. 1928).  The Solici-
tor General declined to seek review of the Diabo decision by the United States Supreme Court, 
stating his view in a memorandum that there was “substantial ground” for believing the Jay Treaty 
and the Treaty of Ghent protected Indians’ free passage right. Memorandum by the Solicitor Gen., 
In re John McCandless, Comm’r of Immigration at Phila. v. Paul Diabo, at 1-2, June 1, 1928 (on 
file with author).  Further, the passage of the free passage statute bolstered his conclusion that Ca-
nadian Indians had a right to free passage and were a “special case” distinguishable from non-
Indian immigration. Id. at 4-5.  The Solicitor General drafted the memorandum before the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that the non-Indian right in the Jay Treaty was abrogated by the War 
of 1812. See Karnuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 241 (1929). 
42. Act of April 2, 1928, ch. 308, 45 Stat. 401, 401 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1359 
(2006)). 
43. See 69 CONG. REC. 5581-82 (Mar. 29, 1928) (statement of Representative MacGregor); 
H.R. REP. NO. 70-1017 (1928); S. REP. NO. 70-568 (1928). 
44. See 69 CONG. REC. 5581-82 (Mar. 29, 1928) (statement of Representative MacGregor). 
        
308 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:301 
Indian tribes or families [was] created by adoption,” but otherwise did not 
define who was included.45  In the case of Canadian Indian free passage, 
Congress left the question to the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals within the Department of Justice to 
determine administratively when presented with alleged Indians seeking to 
cross the border or to remain in the United States.46 
Officials in both entities faced a dilemma: should they follow Canadian 
law when defining “Indian,” or should they apply an American standard 
within federal Indian law or naturalization law?47  As the act referred to 
Canadian Indians, perhaps federal officials should have deferred to 
Canada’s definition as a matter of respect to that sovereign’s laws.  On the 
other hand, federal law provided several ways to define American Indian,48 
and it might have made sense to follow one of these pre-existing and fa-
miliar definitions.  Importantly, in a distinction familiar to modern obser-
vers of federal Indian law, federal officials and judges articulated the 
question as whether the term Indian was considered “political” or 
“ethnological” (i.e. “racial”).49 
Initially, the Board of Immigration Appeals and the INS concluded that 
Indian was a political status defined by Canada’s Indian Act.  The cases 
 
45. Act of April 2, 1928, ch. 308, 45 Stat. at 401.  This was not the first time Congress 
legislated concerning Indians but failed to define the intended group.  Several important statutes 
dealing with criminal jurisdiction on American Indian lands established federal authority over 
crimes committed by “Indians,” but the definition of the term was left to courts to figure out.  See 
Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, sec. 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 
(2006)) (extending federal criminal jurisdiction over “major crimes” committed by “Indians”); Act 
of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, sec. 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 
(2006)) (extending criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian Country, but exempting 
crimes committed by an “Indian” against another “Indian”); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 
How.) 567, 567-68, 571 (1846) (discussing how a white man who was a naturalized citizen of the 
Cherokee Nation was not an “Indian”).  The ambiguity in the meaning of “Indian” in these 
criminal statutes remains more than a century later, as Congress has not clarified the definition.  
See generally Weston Meyring, “I’m an Indian Outlaw, Half Cherokee and Choctaw”:  Criminal 
Jurisdiction and the Question of Indian Status, 67 MONT. L. REV. 177, 230 (2006). 
46. See In re B-----, 3 I. & N. Dec. 191, 192 (B.I.A. 1948); In re S-----, 1 I. & N. Dec. 309, 
310-11 (B.I.A. 1942); In re Mueller, Board of Review Memorandum Decision, June 21, 1939 (on 
file with author). 
47. See In re B-----, 3 I. & N. Dec. at 192; In re S-----, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 310-11. 
48. See, e.g., Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, sec. 19, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 479 (2000)) (defining Indian as, among other definitions, a person of one-half or more Indian 
blood).  For a discussion of the half-blood definition in the IRA, see Paul Spruhan, Indian as 
Race/Indian as Political Status:  Implementation of the Half-Blood Requirement under the Indian 
Reorganization Act, 1934-1945, 8 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 27, 27-49 (2006) [hereinafter 
Spruhan, Indian as Race].  For a general description of various definitions of Indian during this 
time period, see generally Spruhan, Legal History, supra note 15. 
49. See United States ex rel. Goodwin v. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp. 660, 663 (W.D.N.Y. 1947); In 
re B-----, 3 I. & N. Dec. at 192; In re S-----, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 310-11; see infra notes 150-60 and 
accompanying text (discussing the current debate in federal Indian law regarding the classifica-
tion). 
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presented to the Board concerned white women who had married Indian 
men, Indian women who had married white men, and Indians of mixed 
blood.50  Unlike American law, which defined “Indian” in different ways in 
specific legislation,51 Canada defined “Indian” in one general statute, the 
Indian Act.52  Interestingly, “Indian” was defined at the time by race and 
gender, as Indian women who married non-Indian men lost their Indian sta-
tus.53  A child born from such marriage also was not an Indian under the 
act.54  However, a non-Indian woman gained Indian status upon her mar-
riage to an Indian man.55  A child born from such marriage also was an In-
dian.56  Further, the Indian Act included the concept of “enfranchisement,” 
in which certain Indians voluntarily or involuntarily became Canadian citi-
zens, and ceased to be recognized as Indian under Canadian law.57  Ameri-
can law had no analogous definition58 and federal officials struggled with 
accepting Canada’s construction of Indian status. 
 
50. E.g. In re B-----, 3 I. & N. Dec. 191, 191; In re S-----, 1 I. & N. Dec. 309, 310; In re 
Mueller, Board of Review Memorandum Decision, June 21, 1939 (on file with author) (concern-
ing an Indian woman of one-half Indian blood).  The Board of Review became the Board of Im-
migration Appeals after its transfer to the Department of Justice in the 1940s.  U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service—Populating a Nation: A History of Immigration and Naturalization, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/history/ins_history xml (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
51. See supra note 48. 
52. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, Ch. 98, reprinted in SHARON HELEN VENNE, Indian Acts and 
Amendments 1868-1975 in AN INDEXED COLLECTION 244 (1981) [hereinafter Indian Act].  The 
1927 Act in effect at the time of the 1928 free passage statute is an amended version of the origi-
nal Indian Act.  See generally Indian Act, supra note 52 (collecting and indexing the Indian Act 
and amendments). 
53. Indian Act § 14.  The gender rule became part of the Indian Act in 1876.  See Indian Act, 
April 12, 1876, S.C. 1876, ch. 18, § 3(3)(c), reprinted in Indian Act, supra note 52, at 24-25.  
There are several explanations for the rule.  An official Canadian government publication states 
that Canadian officials sought to prevent white men from acquiring Indian property through their 
marriage to Indian women. 4 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Chapter 2, 
Part 3.1 (1996), available at www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sgmm_e html.  This does not ex-
plain, however, why non-Indian women acquired Indian status under the Indian Act. See infra, 
text accompanying note 55.  A recent opinion of the British Columbia Supreme Court suggests 
that the rule was consistent with western legal thought at the time that a woman lost her separate 
legal identity upon marriage and took on the status of her husband. McIvor v. The Registrar, In-
dian and Northern Affairs Canada, [2007] B.C.S.C. 827, slip op. at 9. 
54. Indian Act § 2(d) (defining “Indian” as the child of an Indian man). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. §§ 111-14; see BRIAN A. CRANE ET AL., FIRST NATIONS GOVERNANCE LAW 131-33 
(2006) (discussing enfranchisement under Canadian law).  Indians involuntarily enfranchised in-
cluded for a time those who graduated from a university, became a lawyer, entered holy orders, or 
became ministers.  Id. at 133.  Importantly, the 1927 Indian Act stated that an Indian woman and 
her minor children would be enfranchised automatically upon enfranchisement of her Indian hus-
band, unless the wife was “living apart” from her husband.  Indian Act §§ 110(5), 110(13), 114. 
58. Congress did pass a statute in the late nineteenth century addressing the status of non-
Indian men married to Indian women, and Indian women married to those men.  One provision of 
the statute barred a non-Indian husband, not otherwise a member of an Indian tribe, from any right 
to tribal property.  Act of August 9, 1888, ch. 818, sec. 1, 25 Stat. 392, 392 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
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After several inconsistent policy decisions by federal officials,59 the 
Board of Immigration Appeals adopted the Indian Act’s definition in 
1942.60  In re S----61 concerned several white women married to Canadian 
Indian men who claimed the right to cross the border as “Indians” under the 
1928 free passage law.62  The Board ruled that the INS should follow the 
Canadian definition, and therefore white wives of Indian men were Indians 
entitled to free passage.63  It distinguished between Indian status by mar-
riage and by adoption, and concluded that the 1928 act’s exclusion of 
adopted Indians did not apply to non-Indian wives.64  The Board noted the 
Indian Act’s “comprehensiveness,” and assumed “that is acceptable to the 
Indians as a recognition of their tribal customs and way of life,” as, 
“[a]pparently its only change from traditionally [sic] Indian life is its 
assimilation of tribal life to a patriarchal basis.”65  The Board further con-
cluded that an Indian woman who lost her Indian status through marriage to 
a non-Indian lost her right to free passage, rejecting a prior decision by 
another tribunal that such outcome was “absurd and ridiculous and in-
consistent with the legislative intent [of the 1928 act].”66  Though INS 
officials at first balked at the decision and sought reversal by the Attorney 
General,67 they later accepted it and applied it, allowing only people who 
 
§ 181 (2000)).  Another declared that an Indian woman who married an American citizen became 
a citizen of the United States upon her marriage.  Id. § 2.  However, unlike Canadian law, her mar-
riage and resulting citizenship did not preclude her Indian status.  See id. (stating that marriage 
and citizenship did not impair an Indian woman’s right to tribal property); United States v. Nice, 
241 U.S. 591, 598 (1915) (stating that citizenship and Indian status are not incompatible, and that 
a person may be an American citizen and remain under federal jurisdiction as an Indian).  Though 
Congress granted citizenship to various Indians in piecemeal legislation and then to all Indians in 
1924, see Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 253, citizenship was not inconsistent with 
Indian status.  See Nice, 241 U.S. at 598.  Further, Congress never recognized non-Indian wives as 
entitled to Indian status.  Federal immigration and naturalization law for a time revoked United 
States citizenship from women who married non-citizen men.  See generally Leti Volpp, Divesting 
Citizenship:  On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship through Marriage, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 405 (2005).  However, Congress repealed that law in various acts between 1922 and 1936.  
Id. at 430-448. 
59. See In re S----, 1 I. & N. Dec. 309, 310-12 (B.I.A. 1942) (discussing various positions 
taken by different officials up to 1942). 
60. Id. at 312-13. 
61. 1 I. & N. 309 (B.I.A. 1942). 
62. In re S----, 1 I. & N.  at 309. 
63. Id. at 312-13. 
64. Id. at 311. 
65. Id. at 312. 
66. Id. 
67. Draft Memorandum of Commissioner Earl G. Harrison to Attorney General, October 14, 
1942 (on file with author).  Commissioner Harrison planned to send this memorandum to the at-
torney general, which laid out his objections to the S----- decision, including that the ruling denied 
Indian women who married non-Indian men.  Id. at 3.  The memorandum stated that the Board 
failed to appreciate that, under its decision, a child of an Indian mother and a non-Indian father 
could not cross the border, an outcome “not consonant with the spirit of the 1928 Act.”  Id.  Albert 
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fulfilled the political definition in the Indian Act the special privileges of 
free passage.68  Consistent with the Indian Act, enfranchised Indians were 
also barred from exercising the free passage right.69 
The administrative definition changed after the federal district court for 
the Western District of New York ruled in United States ex rel. Goodwin v. 
Karnuth70 that the term “Indian” in the 1928 act had a “racial connota-
tion.”71  Not coincidentally, the case concerned a full-blooded Indian wom-
an who had lost her Indian status by marriage to a white man.72  The rea-
soning for the conclusion that the term “Indian” was racial is vague, but the 
court claimed it was applying “the common understanding” and “the popu-
lar or received import” of the term “Indian.”73  It appears the court was dis-
turbed by the potential outcome that a full-blooded Indian woman would be 
denied passage based on the peculiarities of Canadian law.74  The court spe-
cifically rejected the application of the Indian Act, noting only that Good-
win had not been enfranchised by her marriage.75  After that case, the Board 
 
Reitzel, Acting General Counsel for INS, apparently convinced the commissioner not to submit 
the memorandum, based on Reitzel’s analysis that non-Indian wives had the right to enter the 
United States with their Canadian Indian husbands whether or not they were “Indians” under the 
1928 act. Memorandum for the Commissioner from Albert E. Reitzel, Acting General Counsel, 
INS, 1-2, Dec. 16, 1942 (on file with author).  Reitzel analogized non-Indian wives to wives of 
Chinese merchants, who the United States Supreme Court ruled were able to immigrate with their 
husbands under a treaty between China and the United States. Id. (citing Cheung Sum She v. 
United States, 268 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1925) and United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459, 468 
(1900)). 
68. Interpretation No. 20 to the INS: Classes of American Indians Born in Canada Entitled to 
Admission to the United States Without Inspection under the Immigration Laws, March 1, 1943 
(on file with author) (stating that the INS would follow the Canadian Indian Act definition of In-
dian for free passage purposes); Letter of T.B. Shoemaker to District Director, Seattle, Mar. 19, 
1943 (on file with author) (discussing the situation of Canadian Indian women married to Filipi-
nos and living in United States and concluding they lost Indian status under Canadian law); Me-
morandum of Commissioner Earl G. Harrison, Commissioner, to A.C. Devaney, Dec. 24, 1942 
(stating that INS would follow the S---- decision and the Canadian Indian Act).  The INS did al-
low Indian women who lost their status through marriage and lived in the United States to acquire 
alien border crossing cards by classifying them as lawful permanent residents. See Smith, supra 
note 29, at 146-47. 
69. Instruction No. 20, supra note 68. Even before the S---- case, INS had taken the position 
that enfranchised Indians were ineligible under the 1928 act.  Letter of Edward J. Shaughnessy to 
Secretary of State, July 17, 1939 (on file with author); Letter of A. R. Archibald to District Direc-
tor of Immigration and Naturalization, Detroit, Nov. 28, 1933 (on file with author).  In a letter to 
the Secretary of State in 1934, an INS official took the position that no threshold blood quantum 
was necessary for Canadian Indians to invoke the free passage right under the 1928 act, but an 
enfranchised Indian was ineligible, and had to have less than one-half Indian blood for entry into 
the United States due to the racial exclusion of Canadian Indians under the 1924 immigration act.  
Letter of Edward J. Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, Nov. 9, 1934 (on file with author). 
70. 74 F. Supp. 660 (W.D.N.Y. 1947). 
71. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp. at 663. 
72. Id. at 660. 
73. Id. at 662-63. 
74. See Id. 
75. Id. 
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of Immigration Appeals changed its view, concluding that Indian was a ra-
cial status under the 1928 act, and therefore anyone who was racially Indian 
was allowed free passage regardless of Indian status under Canadian law.76  
However, the INS’s internal policies still allowed white wives free passage 
with their Indian husbands, despite not being racially Indian.77 
But who was a “racial” Indian?  In the case of a person of mixed 
ancestry, was a certain quantum of Indian blood necessary to be recognized 
as an Indian to pass freely over the border?  Both federal Indian law and 
naturalization law previously applied blood quantum, that is, fractional 
amounts of ancestry, to define the status of “mixed-bloods” as Indian, 
black, Asian, or white for various purposes.78  Blood quantum was espe-
cially common in Indian law, as the federal government adopted the pre-
existing colonial concept of setting a threshold amount of Indian blood to 
define Indian status.79  Importantly, federal cases defining naturalization 
rights applied one-half blood to define whether a person was a “free white 
person” or a “person of African descent,” and therefore eligible to become a 
naturalized citizen.80  As previously discussed, Canadian Indians were in-
eligible for naturalization because they were racially not white or black.81  
Two cases concerned the effect of Indian blood.  In re Camille82 concerned 
a Canadian man of one-half Indian blood.83  The court concluded he was 
not white due to his amount of Indian blood and therefore could not 
naturalize.84  In re Cruz85 concerned a woman who was three-quarters 
Indian and one quarter black.86  The court stated that a person had to have 
an “affirmative quantity” of “African descent,” to be eligible for natur-
 
76. See In re B-----, 3 I. & N. Dec. 191, 192 (B.I.A. 1948). 
77. See Letter of Argyle Mackey, Commissioner, to L.H. LaVigne, Aug. 9, 1951 (on file 
with author) (stating that the INS still allowed non-Indian wives to enter with their Indian hus-
bands despite racial definition of “Indian”). 
78. See generally Spruhan, Legal History, supra note 15; see also IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, 
WHITE BY LAW 46, 59, 160-61 (1996). 
79. See Spruhan, Legal History, supra note 15, at 8. 
80. See, e.g., In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding that a person three-
quarters Indian and one-quarter black was not eligible for naturalization); In re Rallos, 241 F. 686, 
686 (E.D.N.Y. 1917) (holding a half-Filipino, half-Spaniard person not eligible); In re Young, 198 
F. 715, 716 (W.D. Wash. 1912) (holding a half-Japanese, half-German person not eligible); In re 
Knight, 171 F. 299, 300-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1909) (holding a half-English, quarter-Chinese, and quar-
ter-Japanese person not eligible); In re Camille, 6 F. 256, 258-59 (D. Or. 1880) (holding a half-
white, half-Canadian Indian person not eligible). 
81. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
82. 6 F. 256 (D. Or. 1880). 
83. Camille, 6 F. at 257. 
84. Id. at 258-59. 
85. 23 F. Supp. 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1938). 
86. Cruz, 23 F. Supp. at 775. 
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alization; a person of one-half Indian ancestry was ineligible.87  In 1934, an 
immigration official similarly opined to the secretary of state that a 
Canadian mixed-blood who was enfranchised under Canadian law had to 
have less than one-half “ineligible blood” (Indian blood) to immigrate, 
based on the racial exclusion.88 
Congress lifted the racial exclusion for Canadian Indian naturalization 
in 1940.89  Once Indians became racially eligible for naturalization, an in-
teresting result occurred.  In 1946, Congress mandated that a person had to 
have a “preponderance” of blood from the Indian, white, black, or Filipino 
race, or a preponderance of blood from a combination of such bloods to be 
naturalized.90  In a confusing construct, Congress defined naturalization eli-
gibility by requiring more than one-half eligible blood, either from a single 
eligible race or through a combination of several eligible races.91  This 
meant a person who was half-Indian and half-Japanese, for instance, was 
ineligible, but a person three-quarters Indian and one-quarter Japanese was 
eligible.  It was essentially the same rule as the one applied in the case law 
discussed above; one-half eligible and one-half ineligible blood meant a 
person was ineligible.  However, Indians were now part of the eligible club, 
and only those with more than one-half Indian blood could naturalize if the 
other blood came from an “ineligible” race. 
The Board of Immigration Appeals considered the question of mixed-
blood in In re M----92, holding that a person of one-half Indian blood was 
not an “Indian” under the free passage statute.93  The reasoning was again 
vague, but the Board rejected federal Indian law definitions of Indian that 
included half-bloods, and the naturalization cases like Camille that applied 
a half-blood rule; instead a person was required to have a preponderance of 
 
87. Id. 
88. Letter of Edward J. Shaughnessy, supra note 69, at 2.  In this letter, Deputy Commis-
sioner Shaughnessy answered a request from the Secretary of State for an opinion on “the percen-
tage of Indian blood necessary to bring an alien within the terms of the [1928 act].” Id. at 1.  
Shaughnessy replied that no threshold quantum was necessary for Indians who had not been en-
franchised. Id. at 2.  However, citing Camille, he opined that an enfranchised Indian must have 
less than one-half Indian blood to be eligible for immigration. Id. 
89. Act of October 14, 1940, ch. 876, sec. 303, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140.  The act granted the right 
to naturalize to “descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere.” Id.  This included 
Indians from Canada and throughout the Americas. 
90. Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534, sec. 1, 60 Stat. 416, 416.  Also included were “descendants 
of races indigenous” to islands adjacent to North and South America. Id.  The act separately al-
lowed Chinese and “persons of races indigenous to India” to naturalize. Id.  Curiously, the act in-
cluded in such eligible groups persons possessing a preponderance of Chinese blood or blood of 
the races of India, but also separately included persons with one-half such blood and “some addi-
tional” white, black, Indian (that is, Native American), “adjacent islander,” or Filipino blood. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. 4 I. & N. Dec. 458 (B.I.A. 1951). 
93. Id. at 460. 
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Indian blood.94  Though similar to the definition in the 1946 statute 
discussed above, the Board did not cite the statute for the preponderance 
rule.95  Regardless, in a reversal of its prior approach, the Board found that 
a child of a full-blood Canadian Indian and a non-Indian was not an 
“Indian,” regardless of whether he or she had Indian status under Canadian 
law.96 
C. PASSAGE OF THE 1952 REVISION 
The 1952 revision to the free passage statute completed the shift from a 
political definition of Indian to a racial one, by requiring fifty percent or 
more blood of the “American Indian race.”97  The revision was part of a 
comprehensive overhaul of immigration and naturalization law through the 
McCarran-Walter Act, also known as the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act of 1952.98  The most important changes for our purposes were the eli-
mination of racial barriers to naturalization, and the lifting of the bar on 
Asian immigration.99  Instead of a racial bar, citizens of Asian countries 
shared in a national quota system, by which the number of immigrants from 
each nation was capped at a certain limit.100  Though the act was touted as 
an elimination of racial distinctions in immigration and naturalization,101 
the addition of a blood quantum requirement for Canadian Indians actually 
enshrined a racial conception of the free passage right.102 
Why did Congress define the free passage right by blood quantum?  
The legislative history of the act sheds no light on the issue.  Committee re-
ports do not discuss Canadian Indian free passage rights in any detail.103  
 
94. Id.  Though unstated, it might be that the Board felt that a person who is one-half Indian 
and one-half white technically belonged to neither race, and therefore could not be considered In-
dian.  See In re Knight, 171 F. 299, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 1909). 
95. In re M----, 4 I. & N. Dec. 458, 458-59 (B.I.A. 1951).  The subject of the M----- case was 
half-Indian and half-white.  Id.  With that ancestry, he would have been eligible for naturalization, 
and therefore immigration, as the combination of Indian and white blood would fulfill the “pre-
ponderance” test set out in the naturalization provision.  See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying 
text.  M---- was already in the United States, and invoked the free passage right to avoid deporta-
tion for the lack of an immigration visa.  In re M----, 4 I & N. Dec. at 458. 
96. In re M----, 4 I & N. Dec. at 458. 
97. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, sec. 289, 66 Stat. 234 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006)). 
98. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 1365, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1653. 
99. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 1, sec. 201-202, 66 Stat. at 175-78. 
100. Id.  However, the act attributed persons of one-half Asian descent to the quota of the 
Asian country, regardless of whether they we born or lived in that country or not.  Id. § 202(b), 66 
Stat. at 177.  See infra text accompany notes 110-11. 
101. H.R. REP. 1365, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1679-80. 
102. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 9, § 289. 
103. See H.R. Rep. 1365, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1725 (skipping over the Cana-
dian Indian provision in a section-by-section discussion of the bill); General Counsel Opinion No. 
3-54, Admissibility to the United States under Section 289 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
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Indeed, two years after the act, the INS’s general counsel stated that he had 
no idea why the blood quantum requirement was added.104  Later adminis-
trative officials and scholars have asserted different theories.  An INS offi-
cial suggested in a 1993 opinion that “there probably was a perception in 
1952 . . . that a blood quantum needed to be set at some amount or degree to 
exclude those whose Indian ancestry was diluted by generations of inter-
marriage.”105  Sharon O’Brien suggests that the definition was adapted from 
the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, which includes one-half Indian blood 
as one of three alternative categories of Indians subject to the act.106 
It is likely that the definition came from the pre-existing half-blood 
definition in immigration and naturalization law.  As discussed above, 
courts defining “white” and “black” for naturalization applied a half-blood 
standard, barring mixed-bloods with one-half Indian blood.107  Technically, 
the courts did not conclude that such persons were Indian, as they were only 
concerned with whether persons were white or black, and therefore eligible 
for naturalization.108  However, as discussed above, Congress also set the 
line for naturalization eligibility at one-half.109  Further, the half-blood rule 
appears in another section of the 1952 act, concerning quotas for persons of 
Asian descent.110  Though national immigration quotas generally applied to 
a nation, and not to a race, the act stated that all those of one-half Asian 
ancestry, wherever they were born or may reside, would be counted towards 
Asian nations’ overall quota.111 
The half-blood rule was also consistent with the racial conception of 
Indian status applied by the INS and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 
of Certain Non-Indian Wives of Canadian-Born American Indians, at 7-8 (1954) (on file with au-
thor) (noting lack of discussion in legislative history of the act). 
104. General Counsel Opinion No. 3-54, supra, note 103.  INS’s general counsel suggested 
that the congressional committees that drafted the act were aware of Goodwin, see supra notes 64-
68 and accompanying text, and therefore considered Indian to be a racial group, adding only that a 
person had to have 50% or more Indian blood. Id. at 8.  The direct question the general counsel 
answered was whether non-Indian wives could still cross the border freely due to their marriage to 
Canadian Indian men. Id. at 1.  In another significant shift from prior policy, see supra text 
accompanying note 77, the general counsel opined that they were not eligible for free passage, as 
Congress clearly restricted the right in the 1952 revision to those possessing one-half or more 
Indian blood. Id. at 8. 
105. INS General Counsel Opinion No. 93-65 n.3 (Aug. 27, 1993). 
106. See Sharon O’Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Econ-
omies and Families, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 315, 328 (1984); Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, sec. 
19, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2000)); Spruhan, Indian as Race, supra note 
48, at 29 (discussing half-blood component of IRA definition). 
107. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
108. See id. 
109. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
110. Act of June 27, 1952, sec. 202(b), 66 Stat. 175, 177 (repealed 1965). 
111. Id. 
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discussed above.  The only difference was the amount of Indian blood 
considered necessary to be racially Indian.112  Interestingly, in 1945, an 
immigration official in charge of the St. Albans, Vermont, INS office 
proposed the very definition Congress adopted in 1952: 50% or more Indian 
blood regardless of whether the person was considered Indian under 
Canadian law.113  Whether directly adopted or not, Congress applied the 
same conception; Indian was a racial status, and the Indian race was defined 
as having one-half or more Indian blood.114 
The racial definition of Indian status for free passage remains to this 
day.115  All other overtly racial definitions in immigration law have been 
eliminated, including the inclusion of persons of one-half or more Asian 
blood in Asian national quotas.116  As the United States generally has 
moved beyond direct invocations of race in its immigration law, the free 
passage provision is truly anomalous.117 
 
 
112. INS’s general counsel suggested in 1954 that Congress rejected the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals’ view in the M---- opinion that a person had to have more than one-half Indian blood, 
but agreed with the underlying premise that Indian was a racial status.  See General Counsel Opi-
nion No. 3-54, supra note 103, at 8. 
113. Memorandum from H.R. Landis, Dist. Dir., St. Albans, Vt., to the Comm’r of Phila., Pa. 
(May 19, 1945) (on file with author).  Landis suggested that definition after consulting with Cana-
dian officials.  Letter from H.R. Landis Dist. Dir., St. Albans, Vt., to A.L. Jolliffe, Dir. of Immi-
gration, Dep’t of Mines and Resources, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (May 8, 1945) (on file with au-
thor).  Landis asked, among other things, what percentage of Indian blood was required under the 
Indian Act.  Id.  The acting director of the Indian Affairs Branch of the Canadian Department of 
Mines and Resources replied that there was no specific percentage required, and stated that “[t]he 
Act includes a half-breed and quarter-breed, or even lesser breed, providing there is Indian blood 
in the male line.”  Letter from Acting Dir., Indian Affairs Branch, Dept. of Mines and Resources, 
Canada to H.R. Landis, Dist. Dir., St. Albans, Vt. (May 15, 1945) (on file with author).  Landis’s 
proposal then was a conscious deviation from Canadian law on the role of blood quantum in de-
fining Indian. 
114. Act of June 27, 1952 § 289. 
115. See 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006). 
116. See generally Marian Smith, Race, Nationality, and Reality: INS Administration of Ra-
cial Provisions in U.S. Immigration and Nationality Law Since 1898, Parts 1-3, 34 Prologue 91 
(2002) (describing history of racial distinctions and elimination of overt race-based immigration 
and naturalization criteria). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 eliminated restrictive 
quotas based on national origin, and the provision attributing persons of one-half or more Asian 
ancestry to Asian nations. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. (79 Stat. 
911) 883; see generally Gabriel Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A 
New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996) (discussing 
the history of the 1965 act and arguing that Congress intended to eliminate race as a factor in im-
migration).  This does not mean that immigration laws or their implementation do not continue to 
have disparate impact on different groups.  See infra note 168.  Indeed, the 1965 act added a quota 
for immigrants from the Western Hemisphere where none had existed before, restricting the num-
ber of Mexican immigrants able to legally enter the United States. See NGAI, supra note 34, at 
254-58, 260-61.  The same quota restricted the number of legal Canadian immigrants for the first 
time. See id. 
117. See supra note 116. 
        
2009] THE CANADIAN INDIAN FREE PASSAGE RIGHT 317 
III. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BLOOD 
QUANTUM REQUIREMENT 
Though the 1952 provision solved the problem of how to define Indian, 
the implementation of that definition has revealed new problems, as shown 
by Peter Roberts’ situation.  By defining Indian by blood quantum, the 
United States injected a requirement that did not and does not exist in Ca-
nadian law.  As discussed above, Canadian law defined Indian by gender 
and enfranchisement, not blood quantum.118  Canada eliminated, for the 
most part, gender-based definitions in 1985,119 and Indian status is still not 
defined by blood quantum.120  Consequently, Canada, unlike the United 
States, did not and does not record the blood quantum of those recognized 
as Indian.121  Therefore, the question presented is:  how do American immi-
gration officials know that a Canadian Indian invoking the free passage 
right indeed has one-half or more Indian blood? 
Both courts and the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), formerly known as the INS, struggle with 
 
118. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. 
119. The gender discrimination in Canadian Indian law lasted in full force until 1985, when 
Canada finally repealed that part of the Indian Act.  See An Act to Amend the Indian Act, S.C. 
1985, c. 27 (Bill C-31).  Bill C-31 set up a process through which Indian women, their children, 
and enfranchised Indians who lost their Indian status could have their status restored. Id.  
However, issues still remain, as the bill did not restore the Indian status of all persons of Indian 
descent cut off by prior versions of the Indian Act, and the bill continues to exclude certain 
Indians under the so-called “two generation cut-off,” also called the “second generation cut-off,” 
whereby certain descendants of Indians will lose status after two generations of intermarriage. See 
John Giokas & Robert Groves, Collective and Individual Recognition in Canada:  The Indian Act 
Regime, in WHO ARE CANADA’S ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 41, 67-69 (Paul Chartrand ed., 2002).  
The British Columbia Supreme Court recently ruled that Bill C-31 violated the right to equality in 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because of the two generation cut-off rule. See 
McIvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, [2007] B.C.S.C. 827; see Bonita 
Lawrence, Gender, Race, and the Regulation of Native Identity in Canada and the United States:  
An Overview, 18 HYPATIA 3 (2003) (reviewing the gender issue in Canadian Indian law). 
120. See CRANE, supra note 57, at 135-49 (discussing the 1985 reform of Indian Act and the 
current categories of people within definition of Indian).  Some Indian bands have defined their 
membership by blood quantum, but the Indian Act itself does not define Indian status by any thre-
shold amount of Indian blood.  See CRANE, supra note 57, at 138-49 (discussing the definition of 
Indian in the Indian Act); Megan Furi & Jill Wherrett, Indian Status and Band Membership Issues, 
Parliamentary Information and Research Service (2003), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 
information/library/PRBpubs/bp410-e htm#bcontinuingtx (discussing Band membership criteria); 
Sébastien Grammond, Disentangling “Race” and Indigenous Status: The Role of Ethnicity, 33 
QUEEN’S L.J. 487, 514 (2008) (noting that many Indian Bands require 50% or more Indian blood 
for membership).  One scholar has suggested that the Indian Act in effect applies a blood quantum 
threshold in the so-called “second-generation cut-off rule,” which strips certain persons of Indian 
status after two generations of marriages between Indians and non-Indians. See Grammond, supra 
note 120, at 514; supra note 119. 
121. See INS General Counsel’s Opinion No. 93-65, supra note 105 (Canadian Certificate of 
Indian Status not a valid entry document under Section 289 because it does not show blood quan-
tum).  The United States government issues a “certificate of degree of Indian blood,” which indi-
cates the blood quantum of the Indian named on the certificate. 
        
318 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:301 
accommodating Canadian Indians while enforcing the half-blood 
restriction.122  Administrative guidance rejects the use of Indian status 
documents issued by the Canadian government.123  Aware that Indian status 
does not require Indian blood in Canada, USCIS advises officials 
processing Canadian Indians for entry that such documents are not evidence 
of a person’s blood quantum and cannot allow entry into the United States 
under the free passage right.124  Instead, USCIS accepts “blood quantum 
letters” from Indian band officials that state the amount of Indian blood.125  
However, under current Canadian law, Indian status and band membership 
are separate concepts, and people recognized as Indian under the Indian Act 
might not be members of an Indian band.126  Further, some people may be 
of Indian descent, but not be recognized by either the Canadian government 
or an Indian band.127  Such individuals have to produce other documents 
that show that they have at least one-half Indian blood.128 
A case from the Eighth Circuit demonstrates the evidentiary difficulties 
resulting from the blood quantum requirement.  In United States v. 
Curnew,129 the defendant appealed a conviction for illegally re-entering the 
United States after his prior deportation.130  He claimed to be a Canadian 
Indian and invoked the free passage right, but could not produce documents 
showing his quantum of Indian blood.131  He argued that under the 1952 
provision he only needed to show he had some Indian blood and cultural or 
social recognition as an Indian.132  The Eighth Circuit applied a strict 
reading of the free passage statute, stating that Curnew had to establish at 
least 50% Indian blood and that some Indian ancestry was not sufficient.133  
The Court also upheld the district court’s denial of Curnew’s offer of expert 
testimony by an anthropologist to prove his blood quantum, as the expert 
 
122. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. 
123. See INS General Counsel’s Opinion No. 93-65, supra note 105. 
124. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD 
MANUAL 23.8(a). 
125. Id.; American Indian Law Alliance, supra note 9, at 6. 
126. Furi & Wherrett, supra note 120. 
127. See supra note 119. 
128. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE, supra note 124, at 23.8(a).  
It is unclear what documents might fulfill the requirement.  The Adjudicator’s Field Manual only 
lists “a tribal certification that is based on reliable tribal records, birth certificates, and other doc-
uments establishing the requisite percentage of Indian blood.” Id. 
129. 788 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1986). 
130. Curnew, 788 F.2d at 1338. 
131. Id. at 1337. 
132. Id. at 1338. 
133. Id. 
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admitted she could not identify Curnew’s specific amount of Indian 
blood.134 
Peter Roberts apparently had some type of blood quantum letter from 
his Indian band.135  Immigration officials nonetheless sought to block his 
entry through other records purportedly showing he has a smaller quantum 
of Indian blood.136  It is then unclear whether such letters, by themselves, 
will be accepted in the future to establish 50% or more Indian blood, if oth-
er documents suggest a different conclusion. 
One other issue, though not yet litigated in a published case, is whether 
other aboriginal people in Canada, though not technically “Indian,” can in-
voke the free passage right.137  Canada recognizes three categories of abori-
ginal people in its 1982 constitution: (1) Indians, (2) Inuit, and (3) Métis.138  
Up to 1939, Canadian authorities did not consider Inuit to be “Indians” 
within the Canadian government’s responsibility.139  A ruling of the Cana-
dian Supreme Court in 1939 changed that position, holding that they were 
Indians under the jurisdiction of the Canadian federal government.140  How-
ever, since 1951, Inuits are specifically excluded from the Indian Act, and 
Canada has administered Inuit affairs under a separate legal scheme.141  
Métis are persons of mixed Indian and non-Indian ancestry who were expli-
citly excluded from the Indian Act.142  Though not “Indians” they are none-
theless recognized as aboriginal people for certain purposes.143  Ambigui-
ties continue to exist in Canadian law concerning the rights of the different 
aboriginal groups.144  The relevant question here is whether these two other 
groups are able to cross the border and invoke the privileges available to 
“Indians” under American immigration law.145  Nothing in the sparse legis-
lative history suggests Congress was even aware of the distinctions made in 
 
134. Id. at 1339.  Interestingly, a dissenting judge objected to the majority’s approach, stating 
that the majority opinion imposed a “prohibitively onerous” responsibility on the defendant to 
prove through a family tree one-half or more Indian blood.  Id. at 1340 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). 
135. Turnbull, supra, note 4, at B3. 
136. Id. 
137. See American Indian Law Alliance, supra note 9, at 14. 
138. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, e. w. 
35(2). 
139. See Giokas & Groves, supra note 119, at 45. 
140. See Re Eskimos, [1939] D.L.R. 417; see CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE, COLOUR-CODED: A 
LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN CANADA 1900-1950 18-55 (1999) (discussing the history of this 
case). 
141. See Giokas & Groves, supra note 119, at 45 (noting that Inuits are provided federal ser-
vices but excluded from the Indian Act). 
142. DAVID ELLIOTT, LAW AND ABORIGINAL PEOPLES IN CANADA 20 (5th ed. 2005). 
143. Id. at 20-21. 
144. See id.; see Giokas & Groves, supra note 119, at 44-45. 
145. See American Indian Law Alliance, supra note 9, at 14. 
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Canadian law.146  As a practical matter it appears that immigration officials 
currently do not deny free passage claims by these other groups, and in ef-
fect interpret “Indian” to mean “aboriginal,” though it is unclear what doc-
uments members of these groups display to cross the border.147  However, 
the issue whether such groups are racially “Indian” for purpose of the free 
passage right remains.148 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
Though by itself, the Canadian Indian free passage right issue is 
interesting as yet another chapter in the strange career of blood quantum in 
American law,149 there are larger implications for both federal Indian law 
and immigration law.  For Indian law scholars, the blood quantum restrict-
tion on the right is a rare example of an explicitly racial conception of 
Indian status by the federal government that might affect other Indian legis-
lation.150  Before the 1970s, the Court exempted congressional legislation 
concerning Indians from any sort of constitutional judicial review, recog-
nizing an alleged necessity for congressional plenary authority.151  The 
Court has identified the Constitution’s Indian Commerce Clause as the pri-
mary textual source of Congress’ plenary power over Indian affairs.152  
However, the Court now will review the constitutionality of Indian 
 
146. See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text. 
147. See American Indian Law Alliance, supra note 9, at 14 (stating that immigration offi-
cials have not denied entry to Métis or Inuit). 
148. See id. 
149. Recent scholarship describes other chapters in that strange career.  See, e.g., CIRCE 
STURM, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN THE CHEROKEE NATION OF 
OKLAHOMA 78 (2002); Spruhan, Legal History, supra note 15 (stating in the United States, for 
tribal membership, one must meet a certain blood quantum); Spruhan, Indian as Race, supra note 
48, at 27 (explaining the United States’ use of a threshold requirement of blood quantum to be 
considered “Indian”); Kirsty Gover, Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal 
Preference for Descent Rules in Membership Governance, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243, 251 
(2008) (noting that in the United States, blood quantum is a large feature of tribal membership); 
Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Laws and the Race Versus Political Identity Dilemma, 96 
CAL. L. REV. 801 (2008) (discussing use in property laws concerning pacific islanders).  The term 
“strange career” is adapted from the classic history of segregation by C. Vann Woodward, the 
Strange Career of Jim Crow. 
150. See infra notes 154-160 and accompanying text. 
151. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tri-
bal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has 
always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the 
government.”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (stating that federal authority 
over Indians “is necessary to their protection” and that “[i]t must exist in [the federal] government, 
because it never has existed anywhere else”). 
152. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974). 
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legislation, including whether such legislation violates equal protection 
principles.153 
Importantly, the Court, beginning in the seminal case of Morton v. 
Mancari,154 conceptualized Indian status as “political” and not “racial” for 
purposes of equal protection, despite Congress or the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs’s use of blood quantum as one element in defining “Indian.”155  In an 
approach similar to, but independent of the one applied by the INS and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals discussed in this article, the Court has said 
that legislation benefiting members of Indian tribes does not concern a ra-
cial group, as the United States has unique responsibilities to Indian tribes 
as political entities deriving from treaties and other agreements.156  Instead 
of strict scrutiny, the Court will uphold the legislation under a modified ra-
tional-basis review, asking whether it is “tied rationally to the fulfillment of 
Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.”157  However, the use of 
blood quantum to define Indian in such legislation has led to questions 
whether Mancari will continue to shield Indian legislation from strict scru-
tiny review.158  The Iowa Supreme Court recently reviewed legislation that 
defines Indians solely by ancestry, with no requirement of tribal member-
ship, under strict scrutiny, and struck a provision in the state’s version of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act as an impermissible racial classification.159  
 
153. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 236-37 (1997) (striking down a provision 
concerning Indian probate as violating the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause); Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (striking down a waiver of state sovereign immunity in 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act as violating the Eleventh Amendment); Delaware Tribal Busi-
ness Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 90 (1977) (upholding the distribution of tribal property under 
equal protection); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1977) (upholding the Major 
Crimes Act under equal protection); Fisher v. Dist. Ct. of the Sixteenth Jud. Dist. of Mont., 424 
U.S. 382, 389 (1976) (upholding exclusive tribal jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding under 
equal protection); Mancari, 417 U.S. at 354-55 (upholding Indian employment preference regula-
tion under equal protection). 
154. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
155. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554.  The definition of Indian at issue in Mancari required tribal 
membership and one-quarter Indian blood. Id. at 553 n.24.  It was applied to provide Indians with 
employment preference within the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the entity within the Department of 
the Interior with primary authority over Indian programs. See id. at 537.  The Court has followed 
Mancari in several other cases to uphold Indian legislation against equal protection attacks. See, 
e.g., Weeks, 430 U.S. at 73-74; Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645-47; Fisher, 424 U.S. at 390-91. 
156. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. 
157. Id. at 555. 
158. See, e.g., L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs:  The Predicament of Tribes, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 702, 731-48 (2001); Frank Shockey, Invidious American Indian Tribal So-
vereignty:  Morton v. Mancari contra Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Rice v. Cayetano and 
Other Recent Cases, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 275, 294-313 (2000-2001); see Matthew Fletcher, 
Original Understanding of the Political Status of Indian Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 181 
(2008) (arguing for the continued application of Mancari and its conceptualization of Indian status 
as political). 
159. In re A.W., 741 N.W.2d 793, 810-11 (Iowa 2007). 
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So far, Mancari has survived when the definition of Indian, though incorpo-
rating blood quantum, is tied to membership in an Indian tribe recognized 
by the United States.160 
The unequivocal invocation of race in the free passage statute may 
shed light on how to distinguish a racial use of Indian from a political one.  
It is difficult to argue that Congress intended to benefit a political group of 
Canadian Indians incidentally defined by blood quantum.  The term “Amer-
ican Indian race” is directly in the statute, and there is no similar additional 
requirement of membership in a Canadian band.  Further, the United States 
possesses no political relationship with Indian citizens of Canada through 
treaties or other agreements similar to its relationship with American In-
dians.161  Indeed, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the federal department pri-
marily responsible for implementing the federal government’s trust respon-
sibility to Indian tribes, appears to not have participated in the development 
of the free passage legislation, and deferred to INS when questions arose in 
its implementation.162  There is no evidence that Congress believed it was 
invoking its plenary power over Indian affairs when it legislatively recog-
nized the free passage right.  The existence of this separate legislation for 
Canadian Indians might be used to distinguish American Indian legislation, 
which, though it might utilize blood quantum, is grounded in the political 
relationship between the federal government and American Indian tribes.163 
For immigration law scholars, the explicit racial restriction on the free 
passage right may present an opportunity to challenge the exemption of 
immigration legislation from judicial review.  The Supreme Court similarly 
has conceptualized Congress’ authority over immigration as plenary and 
has concluded that Congress may restrict immigration in any way it deems 
 
160. See, e.g., Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645-47. 
161. The United States does have a relationship with some tribes that also have members in 
Canada, including tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy, which have reservations in the United States 
and reserves in Canada.  However, nothing in American law suggests that the political relationship 
extends to tribal members in Canada.  Were the statute reviewed under Mancari’s standard, then, 
it might not survive anyway, as the statute arguably is not “tied rationally to the fulfillment of 
Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.”  Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. 
162. See Letter from Fred Daiker, Assistant to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (Apr. 9, 1941) (on file with author) (referring to an INS 
question by a Canadian Indian woman on eligibility for free passage); Letter from Fred Daiker, 
Assistant to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Immigration and Naturalization Service (Mar. 
25, 1941) (on file with author) (referring to an inquiry by the superintendent of the Fort Peck 
Indian Reservation on the status of Canadian Indians living on a reservation).  It appears that 
neither the 1928 free passage statute nor its 1952 revision were referred to by the Indian affairs 
committees or subcommittees of the House or Senate, and the Canadian Indian problem appears to 
have been considered strictly an immigration issue.  See H.R. REP. NO. 70-1017 (1928); S. REP. 
NO. 70-568 (1928). 
163. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24, 555. 
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appropriate, including through racial restrictions, free of judicial review.164  
The Court has upheld explicit racial bars on Asian immigrants under such 
theory.165  As noted by scholars such as Gabriel Chin, these cases have 
never been overruled.166  Unlike the application of constitutional limitations 
to Indian legislation, the Court has not, as of yet, applied such limitations to 
racial restrictions in immigration, though it has applied a type of rational 
basis review in non-racial challenges to immigration legislation.167  Chin 
and others have alleged a lack of any racial restrictions in current im-
migration law, and that this absence of restrictions precludes challenges to 
overturn prior precedents.168 
 
164. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14, 731 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu 
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 
606 (1889); see generally Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Ter-
ritories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1 (2002) (discussing the connections between plenary authority over Indian affairs and im-
migration); Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power over the “Other”:  Indians, Immigrants, 
Colonial Subjects and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 427 (2002). 
165. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative department, 
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not as-
similate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be 
stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the 
foreigners are subjects. 
Id. 
166. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1998); Saito, supra note 164, at 
447.  The title of this article is adapted from Chin’s article. 
167. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798-800 (1977); Chin, supra note 166, at 65 (arguing 
that the “prevailing judicial and scholarly view . . . is that rational basis review applies” to immi-
gration legislation). 
168. See Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine after September 11, 38 UC-
DAVIS L. REV. 701, 702-03 (2005); Gabriel Chin, Is there a Plenary Power Doctrine?  A Tenta-
tive Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 285 (2000).  Chin argues that: 
[t]he best test of the plenary power doctrine would involve a statute discriminating on 
a basis which domestic law clearly forbids.  If persons of African ancestry or Jewish 
religion or Democratic Party membership were made ineligible for immigration or na-
turalization, or if Congress offered food stamps to Anglo-Saxon aliens only, or pro-
vided that Latino aliens would receive only eighty percent of the welfare benefits giv-
en to other aliens, the Court would overwhelmingly vote to strike it down.  Yet, it is 
not likely that we will see such a case. 
Id.  Kevin Johnson has said that “[e]xpress racial and national origin exclusions, which would 
squarely contradict such icons of the law as Brown v. Board of Education, rarely arise in modern 
immigration law and policy.”  KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE HUDDLED MASSES MYTH:  IMMIGRATION 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 47 (2004).  However, he has also noted that though there are allegedly no ex-
isting overt racial restrictions for admission of immigrants, the enforcement of immigration law 
has impacted racial groups differently.  See Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law En-
forcement:  A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 290 
(2000).  Johnson distinguishes between Chin’s discussion of “de jure racial discrimination,” that 
is, “blatant racial classifications” in admission criteria, and racially discriminatory enforcement of 
facially neutral immigration laws.  Id. at 290-292. 
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However, could persons recognized as Indian in Canada, but who do 
not have at least one-half Indian blood, challenge the free passage restric-
tion as an impermissible racial distinction?  Could non-Indians challenge 
the free passage of Indians under the same theory?169  The statute might of-
fer the opportunity for either group to argue that allowing free passage only 
to persons of 50% or more Indian blood, impermissibly defines immigration 
rights by race.  Of course, merely asserting that it is racial does not mean 
the Supreme Court would apply strict scrutiny; it might still excuse such ra-
cial definitions under Congress’ plenary authority over immigration, and 
apply no judicial review, or apply a rational basis test, perhaps similar to 
Mancari, that in effect would immunize the legislation from equal protec-
tion review.170 
Assuming strict scrutiny applies, the free passage statute would have to 
promote a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to that 
interest.171  Assuming the Supreme Court accepts a governmental interest as 
“compelling” and narrowly tailored, “the means chosen to accomplish the 
government’s asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to 
accomplish that purpose.”172  The narrowly tailored requirement “ensures 
that the means chosen ‘fit’ the compelling goal so closely that there is little 
or no possibility that the motive for the classification was an illegitimate ra-
cial prejudice or stereotype.”173  Put another way, the use of the racial clas-
sification must be “necessary to achieve [the] stated goals.”174 
 
169. A white resident of Hawaii recently successfully challenged election rules for the Office 
of Hawaiian Affairs, which had limited voter eligibility to persons of Native Hawaiian descent.  
See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523-24 (2000).  The United States Supreme Court ruled that 
the definition of Native Hawaiian was racial because Hawaiian was defined by ancestry, and that 
the rules violated the Fifteenth Amendment.  Id. at 514-17, 523-24.  Significantly, the Jay Treaty 
recognized free passage for all British citizens, not just Canadian Indians.  See supra text accom-
panying note 24.  However, the 1928 statute only protected the right of Indians to pass freely.  In 
1929, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the non-Indian free passage right was abrogated 
by the War of 1812.  See supra note 24.  Some argue that the Indian right in the treaty would face 
the same result but for the 1928 statute.  See, e.g., Yablon-Zug, supra note 26, at 569. Given that 
history, could non-Indians argue that the statutory protection of Indian free passage rights but not 
non-Indian Canadian free passage rights impermissibly creates racial benefits for one group rec-
ognized in the Jay Treaty to the detriment of others?  The author makes no comment on the ap-
propriateness of such a challenge, but only suggests that given the racial nature of the definition, 
such a challenge might be made. 
170. See supra note 167 (arguing that the rational basis test from Fiallo would not automati-
cally uphold a racially discriminatory immigration law, as it may be that racial distinctions are per 
se “irrational” and therefore invalid); Chin, supra note 166, at 66-72; infra text accompanying 
notes 184-87 (arguing that the Indian free passage right might nonetheless be upheld as “ration-
al”). 
171. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 
(2007). 
172. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
173. Id. 
174. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 732. 
        
2009] THE CANADIAN INDIAN FREE PASSAGE RIGHT 325 
What is the compelling governmental interest?  Controlling entry from 
Canada?  Even assuming border security was the interest, which would 
seem to be “compelling,” is the half-blood cut-off narrowly tailored to 
promote that interest?  Surely other ways to control entry exist than 
allowing only Canadian Indians of one-half or more Indian blood free 
passage.175  Or was Congress’ interest to affirm the historical, arguably 
treaty-based free passage right of Indians?176  If so, why use a specific 
blood quantum threshold to do so?  To avoid the gender discrimination in 
Canadian law?  Even assuming Congress defined Indian by descent to avoid 
the negative effect of the Canadian Indian Act’s exclusion of Indian women 
married to non-Indian men and their children, it still might have defined 
Indian without relying on a specific quantum of Indian blood.177  If the 
compelling interest is the ongoing recognition of the free passage right, it 
then might not be “necessary” to define Indians as a racial group to 
continue that right.178  However, could the federal government argue that its 
definition is actually more inclusive by using blood quantum instead of the 
Indian Act, and therefore serving the interest of recognizing the free 
passage right better than following Canada’s Indian Act definition, which 
still excludes some Indians, and all Inuit and Métis?179  It is hard to prove.  
Comparative population numbers are difficult to come by given that the 
Canadian government does not record the blood quantum of its Indian, 
Inuit, and Métis citizens, whether recognized under the Indian Act or not.180 
 
175. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91. 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26. 
177. Of course, with the revisions to the Indian Act in 1985, which eliminated the gender-
based definition in effect in 1952, see supra note 119, there is no current reason to define Cana-
dian Indian as a racial status if avoidance of gender discrimination were the motive. 
178. See Parents Involved in Cmty Schs., 551 U.S. at 733. 
179. See Yablon-Zug, supra note 26, at 604 (arguing that the statutory right is broader than 
the right recognized by the Jay Treaty).  Others have argued the opposite, asserting that the blood 
quantum requirement actually limits the number of Indians who can exercise the treaty’s free pas-
sage right, which only refers to “Indians.” See O’Brien, supra note 106, at 328-29. 
180. For example, the Census Operations Division of Statistics Canada produced a statistical 
report on Canada’s aboriginal population based on the 2001 Canadian census. See generally 2001 
CENSUS: ANALYSIS SERIES, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF CANADA:  A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE 
(2003).  According to the report, there were 1,319,890 people of “aboriginal origin,” that is, 
people who reported having an aboriginal ancestor. Id. at 18. 976,305 people identified themselves 
as being Indian, Métis, or Inuit. Id. 558,175 identified themselves as “registered Indians” that is, 
Indians under the Indian Act. Id. 554,860 identified themselves as being members of a band. Id.  
The data is not broken down by blood quantum, and the report notes that the registered Indian 
population was underreported due to problems in enumerating some Indian reserves. Id. at 6.  The 
report also notes that the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development counted 
681,000 registered Indians during the same time period, and that differences in methodology prec-
luded comparison between the two numbers. Id.  In 2007 the Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development reported 763,555 Indians registered under the Indian Act.  FIRST NATIONS 
AND NORTHERN STATISTICS SECTION, REGISTERED INDIAN POPULATION BY SEX AND RESI-
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In the end, these alleged compelling interests are purely speculative.  
The legislative history lacks any discussion of the purpose for applying a 
racial definition, and the federal government might be hard-pressed to assert 
a plausible compelling interest in the absence of any congressional 
guidance.181  It might be that members of Congress simply considered 
Canadian Indians to be a race, as it considered other immigrant groups, 
such as Asians, to be races, and therefore restricted the pre-existing free 
passage right to those it believed to be truly racially Indian.182  Though the 
outcome of a challenge under a strict scrutiny review is ultimately unclear, 
it appears the federal government would have difficulty justifying its use of 
blood quantum in this context.183 
Even under a limited rational basis review, it might be difficult for the 
federal government to argue that limiting Canadian Indian free passage by 
race is “rational.”184  There appears to be no rational justification to define 
Canadian Indians by race, other than the avoidance of the effect of the now-
eliminated gender distinctions in the Canadian Indian Act, or an unproven 
assertion that a half-blood definition is more inclusive than a political defi-
nition.185  However, if an immigration rational basis test were as deferential 
as the Indian law test, it might be that any justification for using blood 
quantum the federal government offered would be sufficient.186  Indeed, 
blood quantum is pervasive in federal Indian law, and when used to define 
Canadian Indians, as opposed to other racial groups in immigration law, it 
might appear “rational” within the context of this larger phenomenon.187 
 
DENCE 2006, ix (2007), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/sts/rip/rip06_e.pdf.  Again, 
however, the Department did not break down the numbers by blood quantum. See id. 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06. 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35. 
183. Cf. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514-17, 523-24 (2000) (holding that the rule defin-
ing Native Hawaiian by descent was impermissible racial classification under the Fifteenth 
Amendment). 
184. See supra note 167. 
185. See supra notes 150, 153. 
186. The outcome may depend on whether the blood quantum definition or the recognition of 
the free passage right itself is reviewed.  The Supreme Court in Mancari upheld the use of blood 
quantum in the employment preference regulation because it believed that the preference itself 
was “rationally tied to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique relationships towards the Indians,” not 
because the blood quantum definition was so “rationally tied.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 
555 (1974).  Put another way, the Court did not analyze whether the definition of “Indian” used in 
the preference regulation was rational; it held that providing employment preference was “reason-
able and rationally designed to further Indian self-government.”  Id.  It then might be that the use 
of blood quantum is justified as long as the program that implements the blood quantum definition 
is rationally related to an important governmental interest.  In this situation, asserting that the free 
passage statute is rationally related to the protection of an historically-recognized right might then 
be enough. 
187. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
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For those who support the free passage rights of Canadian Indians, how 
might the potential constitutional problems be avoided?  One possibility 
might be for Congress to revise the free passage statute again and eliminate 
the blood quantum requirement.  Congress might replace blood quantum 
with a different definition, perhaps tied to Canada’s 1982 Constitution, 
which uses the term “aboriginal peoples of Canada,” a classification 
arguably not racial in nature, at least from an American perspective.188  
Using the term “aboriginal peoples” or some similar term is more inclusive 
than applying the Indian Act’s definition and avoids the controversial 
history and current status of that act.  This might create even more com-
plicated problems in identification, however, because the Canadian 
Constitution does not define “aboriginal peoples,” except to include 
“Indians,” “Inuit,” and “Métis.”189  Though such a statutory revision might 
avoid the potential constitutional problem, in practice it might be imprac-
tical to apply without a clear definition.  In the end, there appears to be no 
perfect fix; any decision has negative consequences by cutting off some part 
of the Canadian aboriginal population, or by including so large and ill-
defined a group that enforcement becomes impossible.190  However, the 
racial problem might be avoided by shifting the definition from a straight 
blood quantum threshold to some politically-based criteria, if such criteria 
could be found.191 
 
188. See supra text accompanying note 155; but see Giokas & Groves, supra note 119, at 43 
(suggesting that Canadian law views Indians as a racial classification, and that Canadian authority 
to legislate for Indians is tied to Indian ancestry or descent); Grammond, supra note 120, at 488-
490 (discussing the views of some Canadian judges that indigenous rights in Canadian law are 
fundamentally racial in nature).  Unlike American law, Canadian law currently does not recognize 
inherent aboriginal sovereignty, and it therefore might be difficult to import a “political” concept 
of Indian status as articulated in Mancari into the Canadian situation.  As discussed above, 
however, American officials viewed the Indian Act as a “political” definition of Indian, though it 
is unclear exactly why. See supra text accompanying notes 60-69.  It appears that the inclusion of 
wives with no Indian ancestry as “Indians” in the act rendered the definition “political” in the 
minds of such officials.  As Indian status under Canadian law still does not require Indian 
ancestry, American law might still classify Indians as a political group, even if there is no 
analogous concept of sovereignty. 
189. See supra note 138. 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 179 and 185 (discussing the issue of more or less 
inclusiveness under various definitions). 
191. If Canadian law views Indian status as racial, but appropriate under its constitution, see 
supra note 158, there may not be a “political” definition that can apply to the free passage right if 
Congress again applies a definition tracking Canadian law. See supra note 158.  The “racial” na-
ture of the Canadian law’s conception of Indian status still might not be dispositive, however, as 
American law might view Indian status as political under Mancari’s racial and political dichotomy 
regardless of Canada’s position. Id.  At the very least, Congress could still avoid the problems as-
sociated with applying blood quantum, and potentially provide greater protection from constitu-
tional attack. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Canadian Indian free passage statute is anomalous, whether 
considered from an Indian law or immigration law perspective.192  Time 
will tell whether other Indians like Peter Roberts will face problems 
crossing the border, and whether they will challenge the blood quantum re-
striction, or whether others, including non-aboriginal people, will challenge 
the free passage right or its blood quantum restriction.  Long relegated to 
the occasional footnote in legal scholarship,193 the definition of “Indian” in 
the statute has much to say about how both Indians and race are con-
ceptualized in American law.194 
 
 
192. See supra notes 61-63, 168 and accompanying text. 
193. See, e.g., Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, § 5.07[2][f] nn. 554 & 555 (2005) 
(noting the free passage statute in a footnote).  The treaty, tribal sovereignty, and border security 
issues arising out of the free passage statute have received attention. See supra note 23.  However, 
the implications of the racial restriction itself have not been discussed in any detail. See Castella, 
supra note 26, at 198 n.59 (mentioning the racial issue, but stating that implications are not within 
scope of the article). 
194. See supra notes 149 and 158. 
